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Recent Civil Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2006-2007 Term
Charles H. Whitebread

T

In Davenport v. Washington Education Association,1 the Court
upheld a state law limiting the use of non-union member fees.
Washington State law permits unions and government employers to engage in agency-shop agreements, which allow unions
to charge dues to non-union members to “prevent nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts.” However,
Washington law requires authorization by a nonmember
before using his fees “to make contributions or expenditures to
influence an election or to operate a political committee.” The
respondent is “the exclusive bargaining agent for approximately 70,000 public educational employees,” and in this
capacity, it “collected agency fees from nonmembers that it
represented in collective bargaining.” The State of Washington
brought suit against the respondent, as did several nonmembers who paid agency shop fees, claiming its “use of agency
fees was in violation of § 760” and that the “respondent had
failed to obtain affirmative authorization from nonmembers
before using their agency fees for the election-related purposes
specified in § 760.” The Supreme Court of Washington held
that section 760 violated the First Amendment “by imposing
on respondent the burden of confirming that a nonmember
does not object to the expenditure of his agency fees for electoral purpose” and by “interfer[ing] with respondent’s expressive associational rights….” The Court begins by examining
the Supreme Court of Washington’s reasoning and noting that
it reached its holding mostly based on a passage from Teachers
v. Hudson,2 which states: “‘[D]issent is not to be presumed—it
must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.’” The Court rejects this line of reasoning
because it improperly extends this precedent in assuming “that
unions have … constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.” Additionally, the Court acknowledges

that “content-based regulations of speech are presumptively
invalid,” but it finds that precedent also establishes “that the
government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech.” The Court finds this latter principle applicable to the case at hand because section 760 was concerned with
the integrity of the electoral process and was “limited to the
state-created harm that the voters sought to remedy.”
In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v.
Brentwood Academy,3 the Court held that a state-sponsored
high-school athletic league’s rule prohibiting “undue influence” in recruiting middle-school athletes does not violate the
First Amendment. The petitioner, Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association (TSSAA), regulates sports among
numerous private and public high schools in Tennessee,
including the respondent: Brentwood Academy. TSSAA prohibits these schools “from using ‘undue influence’ in recruiting
middle school students for their athletic programs.”
Brentwood Academy’s football coach violated this prohibition,
and the TSSAA placed sanctions upon Brentwood. Afterwards,
Brentwood brought this action against TSSAA, alleging that the
prohibition violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and that TSSAA “deprived the school of due process of law”
because of its handling of its appeal. The Court first notes that
“Brentwood’s speech rights are not absolute” and that “[t]he
anti-recruiting rule strikes nowhere near the heart of the First
Amendment” because it regulates “direct, personalized communication in a coercive setting” as opposed to “prohibiting
appeals to the public at large,” a distinction illustrated in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.4 In Ohralik, the Court held that
a state bar association’s decision to discipline a lawyer “for the
in-person solicitation of clients” does not violate the First
Amendment because the “ban was more akin to a conduct regulation than a speech restriction.” In examining Ohralik, the
Court concludes that its “‘narrow’ holding is limited to conduct that is ‘“inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct.”’” The Court believes that this “danger
of undue influence … [is] also present when a high school
coach contacts an eighth grader” because of the “youthful
hopes and fear” involved in the decision whether to play highschool sports at a particular school. Against this background,
the Court holds that “TSSAA’s limited regulation of recruiting
conduct poses no significant First Amendment concerns.”
In a narrow decision, the Court held in Morse v. Frederick5
that a high-school principal did not violate the respondent’s

Footnotes
1. 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
2. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).

3. 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
4. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
5. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).

he past Term of the Court was one in which it swung to
the right. A single justice, Justice Anthony Kennedy,
made all the difference—being in the majority in every
five-to-four decision that split along ideological lines.
Significant 5-4 civil decisions included ones upholding the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, limiting Title VII paydiscrimination suits by strictly interpreting the date the statute
of limitations begins to run, limiting the ability of school districts to consider race in assigning students to schools, and further limiting punitive-damage claims.
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First Amendment rights by requiring him to take down a
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner. The petitioner, Deborah
Morse, a high-school principal in Alaska, gave permission to
her students, including respondent Joseph Frederick, to miss
classes to view the passing of the Olympic Torch Relay. As the
torch and camera crews passed, Frederick and several of his
friends displayed a 14-foot banner reading: “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.” Thinking the banner “encouraged illegal drug use, in
violation of school policy,” Principal Morse told the students to
take it down, and “[e]veryone but Frederick complied.” After
confiscating the banner, she suspended Frederick. Frederick
argues “that this is not a school speech case.” The Court
begins by rejecting this argument because the event in question occurred during regular school hours and “was sanctioned
by Principal Morse ‘as an approved social event or class trip.’”
The Court next examines the banner, finding its message to be
“cryptic,” but agreeing with Morse that it could reasonably be
interpreted as advocating the use of illegal drugs. The Court
rejects Frederick’s argument that he was just trying to get on
television because it might explain his motive, but not the content of the sign. In light of its findings, the Court frames the
relevant issue as “whether a principal may … restrict student
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.” The Court finds that its
precedent recognizes “that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.”
The Court holds that in light of “‘the special characteristics of
the school environment’” and the drug-use problem in schools,
school officials may “restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.” The Court
states that Morse acted reasonably in believing that the banner
promoted the use of illegal drugs and feels “that failing to act
would send a powerful message to the students … about how
serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.”
Given its holding, the Court does not reach the issue of qualified immunity.
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc.,6 a 5-4 Court held that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA) is unconstitutional as applied to respondent’s issue-focused advertisements because the FEC cannot
demonstrate that the statute’s ban on these ads is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. The BCRA makes it a
crime for a corporation to use company funds for any “‘electioneering communication,’” which includes “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for
federal office and that is aired within 30 days of a federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the
jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for office.” In
2004, the respondent, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL),
planned to air three television and radio commercials arguing
against a Senate filibuster and encouraging viewers to
“‘[c]ontact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose
the filibuster.’” WRTL realized that its planned airing would
violate BCRA section 203 and filed suit against the Federal

Election
Commission
[A] 5-4 Court held
(FEC) seeking declaratory
that the Bipartisan
and injunctive relief. The
Court first addresses the
Campaign Reform
FEC’s argument that “these
Act of 2002 is
cases are moot because the
unconstitutional as
2004 election has passed
….” The Court disagrees
applied . . . to
because the WRTL reasonissue-focused
ably expects to run “‘materially similar’” ads in the advertisements . . . .
future, and “there is no reason to believe that the FEC will ‘refrain from prosecuting violations.’” The Court next turns to the First Amendment issues
presented, stating that “[b]ecause § 203 burdens political
speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny” and “the Government
must prove that applying BCRA to WRTL’s ads furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Because McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n7 already
upheld BCRA “to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its
functional equivalent,” the Court states that if the ads in this
case fall into these categories, the FEC has proven its case.
However, if they do not, the FEC must meet the more difficult
standard above. To help this determination, the Court adopts
an objective test, holding that “a court should find an ad is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal
to vote for or against a specific candidate.” The Court concludes that WRTL’s ads “are plainly not the functional equivalent of express advocacy” because they “focus on a legislative
issue, take a position on that issue, … and … do not mention
an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger ….” The
Court next applies the “narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest” standard. Citing Buckley v. Valeo,8 the Court
notes its long recognition of “‘the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption’ in election campaigns.” However, the Court sees no reason for
extending speech limitations outside the context of campaign
speech and concludes that the regulation of corporate campaign speech “has no application to issue advocacy of the sort
engaged in by WRTL.”
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,9 a split
Court held that respondents, as taxpayers, lack standing under
Article III to challenge the executive branch’s organization of
conferences allegedly promoting religion. In 2001, President
Bush formed the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives to “ensure that ‘private and charitable
community groups, including religious ones … have the fullest
opportunity permitted by law to compete on a level playing
field….’” Congress did not enact legislation promoting the
Office or any of the related centers, and the money for them
comes solely from “general Executive Branch appropriations.”
The respondents, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,
and three of its members, filed suit in federal court, arguing

6. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).

8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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that the petitioners violated
the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution by organizing conferences that
were allegedly “designed to
promote, and had the effect
of promoting, religious
groups over secular ones.”
Justice Alito announced the
judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in
which Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy joined.
He begins by noting that
under Establishment Clause
precedent, parties cannot challenge laws of general application
unless they have been personally injured, and generally “the
interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are
spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to
the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required for Article III
standing.” He notes that Flast v. Cohen10 created a “narrow
exception” to this principle but requires a taxpayer to establish: (1) a “‘logical link between the status and the type of legislative enactment attacked;’” and (2) “‘a nexus between the
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged.’” The respondents argue that Flast should govern the
present case. Justice Alito finds the requisite link does not
exist in the present case because the respondents do not challenge any specific congressional appropriation and the expenditures at issue “resulted from executive discretion, not congressional action.” Justice Alito also rejects the respondents’
position because he feels that without a distinction between
executive and congressional spending, almost “every federal
action” would be subject to an Establishment Clause challenge. Justice Alito further notes that the respondents have
failed to supply a “workable limitation” on such challenges if
Flast were extended to govern their case.

[A] 5-4 Court . . .
held that the
Constitution requires
some procedural
method for ensuring
that juries do
not use punitive
damages to punish
. . . for harm caused
to nonparties.

between the punitive damages and compensatory damages was
unreasonable under BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.12 The
Court granted certiorari on two questions: (1) whether
“Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted [Philip Morris] to
be punished for harming nonparty victims;” and (2) “whether
Oregon had in effect disregarded ‘the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiff’s harm.’”
The Court focuses its analysis on the Due
Process Clause, finding that it “forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts
upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent.”
Therefore, states must “provide assurance that juries are not …
seeking … to punish for harm caused strangers.” The respondent argues that the Oregon Supreme Court understood this
and did not allow punitive damages against nonparties. The
Court agrees that some sections of the Oregon Supreme Court’s
opinion focus “only upon reprehensibility” but concludes that
that court erred in affirming the Oregon Court of Appeals’
decision because it did not allow any form of protection
against the jury awarding punitive damages for injuries to nonparties.
CIVIL RIGHTS

In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,11 a 5-4 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, held that the Constitution
requires some procedural method for ensuring that juries do
not use punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm
caused to nonparties. The respondent, the widow of Jesse
Williams, filed a lawsuit against Philip Morris for negligence
and deceit. A jury found that Williams’s death resulted from
smoking Marlboro cigarettes and that Philip Morris led him to
believe smoking was safe. The jury awarded respondent
$821,000 on the deceit claim and $79.5 million in punitive
damages. On review, Philip Morris argued that the trial court
erred in rejecting a jury instruction regarding punitive damages “that specified the jury could not seek to punish Philip
Morris for injury to other persons not before the court.” Philip
Morris also argued that the approximately 100-to-1 ratio

In Wallace v. Kato,13 a 7-2 Court held that a cause of action
for a claim of false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
begins at the time the prisoner is subjected to legal process.
The petitioner Andrew Wallace was picked up by police officers in Chicago on January 19, 1994, two days after John
Handy was shot to death. He was taken to the police station
around 8 p.m. and interrogated until the early morning of the
following day, when he agreed to confess to Handy’s murder.
The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder at trial and
sentenced to 26 years in prison. The Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed the conviction because officers had no probable cause when arresting petitioner, a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The prosecutors subsequently dropped all
charges against petitioner on April 10, 2002. On April 2, 2003,
the petitioner filed suit against the city of Chicago and several
police officers under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for damages arising from his unlawful arrest. The District Court granted
respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, finding the suit barred under the applicable
statute of limitations because the petitioner’s “cause of action
accrued at the time of his arrest, not when his conviction was
later set aside.” The Court begins by noting that both sides
agree that the correct statute of limitations is two years, but
they contest when the petitioner’s cause of action began. The
Court finds that the tort of false imprisonment is analogous to
the petitioner’s claim because “the sort of unlawful detention
remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal process.” Because the statute of limitations on false
imprisonment claims begins to run “‘when the alleged false
imprisonment ends,’” the Court must decide when the petitioner’s false imprisonment ended. The Court holds that false

10. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
11. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).

12. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
13. 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007).
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imprisonment ends “once
the victim becomes held
pursuant” to legal process
and that any claim after this
point would be for malicious prosecution. Therefore, the Court concludes
that the petitioner’s cause of
action began “when he
appeared before the examining magistrate and was
bound over for trial,” and
the two-year limitations period has run.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.,14 a 5-4
Court held that petitioner’s sex-discrimination claims based on
pay decisions made prior to the 180-day period required by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were time barred. The petitioner Lilly Ledbetter was employed by the respondent
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and she filed a questionnaire and a formal charge of sex discrimination in 1998 with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Later the same year, after retiring, the petitioner began this
action, asserting “a Title VII pay discrimination claim and a
claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).” A jury awarded
her backpay and damages. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit,
Goodyear claimed that the petitioner’s claim “was time barred
with respect to all pay decisions made prior to … 180 days
before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire” and that “no discriminatory act relating to Ledbetter’s pay occurred after that
date.” The Eleventh Circuit agreed and reversed the lower
court’s decision. The Court begins by examining Title VII,
which requires an employee seeking to challenge an allegedly
discriminatory practice to “file a charge with the EEOC …
within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days, depending
on the State) ‘after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.’” The petitioner argues that each paycheck she
received “was a separate act of discrimination,” and, alternatively, that a 1998 evaluation with no raise was “‘unlawful
because it carried forward intentionally discriminatory disparities from prior years.’” The Court rejects both these arguments because the petitioner does not allege that Goodyear
had discriminatory intent during either of these acts, but only
“prior to the EEOC charging period.” The Court notes that
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans15 held that “the continuing effects
of the precharging period discrimination did not make out a
present violation.” The Court also cites Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc.,16 which held “that the … charging period
ran from the time when the discrete act … occurred, not from
the date when the effects of this practice were felt.” Based on
these decisions, the Court finds that “[a] new violation does
not occur … upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from past discrimination.” The Court concludes that the petitioner’s claim

of continuing effects of past discrimination is inconsistent with
these decisions.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No 1.,17 a 5-4 Court held that two school-district student-distribution plans are unconstitutional to the extent that
they rely solely upon race as a determinative factor. In 1998,
the respondent Seattle School District No. 1 implemented a
new student-distribution plan. If a school is “not within 10
percentage points of the district’s” 41% white and 59% “nonwhite” balance, the district will select for “students whose race
‘will serve to bring the school into balance.’” The petitioner,
Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued in District
Court, alleging that the system violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In 2001, the respondent Jefferson County adopted a
program under which all nonmagnet schools must maintain a
minimum 15% and a maximum 50% black enrollment. The
petitioner Crystal Meredith applied to transfer her son to a
school only one mile from her home but was denied because it
“‘would have an adverse effect on desegregation compliance.’”
The petitioner brought suit, alleging violations of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court first notes that racial classification plans must be “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.’” The Court has recognized two
compelling interests in the context of racial classifications: (1)
“remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination”; and
(2) promoting “diversity in higher education.” The Court
finds that the first applies in neither case. The second compelling interest was outlined in Grutter v. Bollinger,18 which
reiterated that “‘it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity,
in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can
justify the use of race.’” Grutter upheld a law-school admissions process that took race into account to achieve diversity.
In contrast to the system in Grutter, the Court finds that in
those at issue here, race “is not simply one factor weighed with
others in reaching a decision …; it is the factor.” The Court
also feels that unlike the system in Grutter, those in the instant
cases “employ only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race
exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and
black/‘other’ terms in Jefferson County.” The respondents offer
two other possible compelling interests: (1) race classifications
“[help] to reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure
that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent
nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable
schools”; and (2) schools have an interest in “educating … students ‘in a racially integrated environment’” because “education and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially
diverse learning environment.” The Court rejects these interests because they are “not narrowly tailored to the goal of
achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow
from racial diversity” and because this type of “‘outright racial
balancing’” would “‘assur[e] that race will always be relevant
in American life, and that the “ultimate goal” of “eliminating

14. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
15. 431 U.C. 553 (1977).
16. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).

17. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
18. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

[A] 5-4 Court held
that two . . . student
distribution plans
are unconstitutional
[because] they rely
solely upon race
as a determinative
factor.
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entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant
factors as a human being’s race” will never be achieved.’” The
Court also finds that the “minimal impact [of the programs] …
casts doubt upon the necessity of using racial classifications.”
Lastly, the Court rejects the arguments in Justice Breyer’s
lengthy dissent as a misunderstanding and misapplication of
its precedent. The Court concludes that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimination on
the basis of race.”
FEDERALISM

In United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Management Authority,19 a divided Court held that flowcontrol ordinances benefiting a public enterprise do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because they do not discriminate against interstate commerce. The two respondent
counties involved in this case have traditionally disposed of
their own waste, but “[b]y the 1980’s, the Counties confronted … a solid waste ‘crisis.’” In response, they requested
the creation of respondent Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority (Authority), and New York’s legislature obliged. Under an agreement between the counties and
the Authority, “private haulers would remain free to pick up
citizens’ trash…, but the Authority would take over the job of
processing the trash, sorting it, and sending it off for disposal.” The counties used “flow control ordinances” mandating that “all solid waste generated within the Counties be
delivered to the Authority’s processing sites.” To cover its
expenses, the Authority collected “tipping fees” that “significantly exceeded those charged for waste removal on the open
market.” The petitioners represent six private waste haulers
that operated in the counties. In 1995, they sued the respondents, “alleging that the flow control laws violate the
Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce.” The petitioners submitted evidence that the market
price for disposing of waste was between $37 and $55 per ton,
while the Authority’s tipping fee was $86 per ton. The Court
begins by laying out the dormant Commerce Clause test,
which requires the Court to “first ask whether [a law] discriminates on its face against interstate commerce.” Those
discriminatory laws that are “motivated by ‘simple economic
protectionism’ are subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity’ … which can only be overcome by a showing that the State
has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.” In
analyzing the ordinances, the Court states that “it does not
make any sense to regard laws favoring local government and
laws favoring private industry with equal skepticism” in that
“laws favoring local government … may be directed toward
any number of legitimate goals” while laws favoring in-state
business are “often the product of ‘simple economic protectionism.’” Finding that the flow-control ordinances “benefit a
clearly public facility, while treating all private companies
exactly the same,” the Court holds that they “do not discriminate against interstate commerce.” The Court next applies

19. 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
20. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

the test established in Pike v.
[T]he Court held
Bruce Church, Inc.,20 which
states that the Court “will that the Individuals
uphold a nondiscriminatory
with Disabilities
statute like this one ‘unless
Education Act
the burden imposed on
affords parents
[interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation independent rights
to the putative local bene- to prosecute related
fits.’” Because “both the
Magistrate Judge and the claims . . . on their
own behalf.
District Court could not
detect any disparate impact
on out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses,” the Court
concludes that “any arguable burden does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In Winkelman v. Parma City School District,21 the Court held
that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
affords parents independent rights to prosecute related claims,
and they may do so on their own behalf. The petitioner Jacob
Winkelman, represented by his parents, is a child with autism
spectrum disorder. The respondent Parma City School District
participates in IDEA’s education-spending program and
“accepts federal funds for assistance in the education of children with disabilities.” These funds are conditioned on the
school structuring, with the participation of Jacob’s parents, an
individualized education program (IEP) for Jacob. Jacob’s parents disagreed with the school’s proposed IEP for the 20032004 school term and sought administrative review. A hearing
officer rejected their claims, and they appealed to a state-level
review officer. After the review officer affirmed the hearing
officer’s decision, the petitioners “on their own behalf and on
behalf of Jacob,” filed a complaint, “without the aid of an attorney,” in federal court, where it was rejected. The petitioners
appealed this decision, and the Sixth Circuit, “[r]elying on its
recent decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School Dist.,22 …
entered an order dismissing the appeal unless petitioners
obtained counsel to represent Jacob.” Cavanaugh held that in
the IDEA context, the “right to a free appropriate public education ‘belongs to the child alone’” and parents rights are
“‘derivative’ of the child’s right.” The Cavanaugh court concluded that because IDEA “does not abrogate the common-law
rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor
children,” parents cannot proceed pro se with IDEA litigation
in federal court. The Court first notes that several provisions
of IDEA guarantee parents “protections that apply throughout
the IEP process” and another requires the local education
agency to “‘resolv[e] … complaint[s] to the satisfaction of the
parents.’” The Court also finds that IDEA “sets forth procedures … that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates parents
will be the parties bringing the … complaints.” Because “parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage,” the

21. 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007).
22. 409 F. 3d 753 (2005).

Court Review 121

Court holds that “it would
be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme to bar
them from continuing to
assert these rights in federal
court.” The Court rejects
the respondent’s alternative
interpretation of the statute and concludes that because parents have independent rights under IDEA, “they are … entitled
to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.” Therefore, the
Court “need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which
concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s
claims pro se.”
In Sole v. Wyner,23 a unanimous Court held that the respondent is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because a
plaintiff who wins a preliminary injunction but later loses the
same case on the merits is not a prevailing party. The respondent T.A. Wyner filed suit against the petitioners, including the
Secretary of Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP). She alleged that Florida’s “Bathing Suit Rule,” which
requires that patrons in Florida’s state parks “wear at a minimum, a thong and, if female, a bikini top,” violated her First
Amendment right to engage in artwork that “would consist of
nude individuals assembled into a peace sign.” The District
Court granted respondent a preliminary injunction and
allowed the DEP to put up a screen, behind which the exhibit
would take place. However, “the display was set up outside the
barrier, and participants, once disassembled from the peace
symbol formation, went into the water in the nude.” After this
occurrence, the trial continued and respondent sought a permanent injunction because she intended to stage a repeat
exhibit the next year. The District Court granted petitioner’s
motion for summary final judgment, holding that “[t]he deliberate failure of Wyner and her coparticipants to remain behind
the screen at the 2003 … display … demonstrated that the
Bathing Suit Rule’s prohibition of nudity was ‘no greater than
is essential….’” Despite its ruling, the District Court held that
Wyner had prevailing-party status because she initially
obtained the preliminary injunction. Under 42 U.S.C. section
1988(b), Congress gave federal district courts discretion to
“‘allow the prevailing party … a reasonable attorney’s fee as
part of the costs.’” Accordingly, the District Court “awarded
[respondent] counsel fees covering the first phase of the litigation.” The Court begins by examining the definition of a “prevailing party.” The Court finds that in the case at hand, “the
preliminary injunction hearing was necessarily hasty and
abbreviated” and that the relief “expired before appellate
review could be gained.” In this context, the Court holds that
“[t]he final decision in Wyner’s case rejected the same claim
she advanced in her preliminary injunction motion” and that
“her initial victory was ephemeral.” Therefore, the Court concludes “that a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction does
not qualify for an award of counsel fees under §1988(b) if the
merits of the case are ultimately decided against her.”

In Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.,24 a unanimous
Court held that mere compliance with federal agency regulations, even where an agency closely monitors activities, is not
“acting under” the government for purposes of the federal officer removal statute. The petitioners filed suit in state court
against the respondent Philip Morris Companies for allegedly
engaging in “unfair and deceptive business practices” in advertising certain cigarettes as light. The complaint accuses the
respondent of manipulating its cigarettes’ performance in the
tobacco industry’s Cambridge Filter Method tests “‘to register
lower levels of tar and nicotine … than would be delivered to
the consumers of the product.’” The respondent removed the
case to Federal District Court under the federal officer removal
statute, which allows the removal of suits against the “United
States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency
thereof ….” The petitioner argues that the removal is invalid.
The Court begins its opinion by addressing the extensive history surrounding the federal officer removal statute. After analyzing this background, the Court concludes that the statute
“was ‘[o]bviously … an attempt to protect federal officers from
interference by hostile state courts.’” Turning to the pertinent
language, the Court finds that “[t]he relevant relationship is
that of a private person ‘acting under’ a federal ‘officer’ or
‘agency’” and that the plain meaning of this “relationship typically involves ‘subjection, guidance, or control.’” The Court
reasons that “simply complying with the law” does not fall
under this phrase and would not normally trigger the threat of
state court prejudice that the statute was designed to protect
against. The Court holds that “a highly regulated firm cannot
find a statutory basis for removal in the fact of federal regulation alone, … even if the private firm’s activities are highly
supervised and monitored.” Philip Morris contends that in
conducting the cigarette tests, it did more than merely comply
with Government regulations but was acting under “‘delegated
authority’” from the FTC. The Court points out that no official
delegation of legal authority was ever made from the FTC to
the tobacco industry “to undertake testing on the Government
agency’s behalf.” The Court concludes that it “can find nothing that warrants treating the FTC/Philip Morris relationship
as distinct from the usual regulator/regulated relationship” and
that this relationship alone “cannot be construed as bringing
Philip Morris within the terms of the statute.”

23. 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007).
24. 127 S. Ct. 2301 (2007).

25. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
26. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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ABORTION

In Gonzales v. Carhart,25 a 5-4 Court upheld the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003. Congress passed the Act in
response to Stenberg v. Carhart.26 In Stenberg, the Court invalidated a state ban on certain abortion procedures used in later
stages of pregnancy. While the laws at issue are similar, the
language of the Act is “more precise in its coverage” than the
Stenberg statute and was supported by factual findings from
Congress. The Act provides in pertinent part that “‘[a]ny
physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,

knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion … shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.’”
The term “partial-birth abortion” is defined as a procedure in
which a physician: “deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother,
or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal
trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the
purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will
kill the partially delivered living fetus.” The respondents filed
suit in federal court against the Attorney General of the United
States and were awarded permanent injunctions barring
enforcement of the Act in most situations. The Court begins
by discussing the abortion procedures at issue. The usual
method for abortion during the second trimester is dilation
and evacuation (D&E), and in a normal D&E procedure, the
doctor will dilate the cervix and insert forceps to grab the fetus
and “[pull] it back through the cervix and vagina.” The
numerous acts banning partial-birth abortions were motivated
by a variation on this procedure known as intact D&E. Intact
D&E is similar to regular D&E, but the goal is that the fetus
remains whole. Normally, the “fetus’ head lodges in the cervix,
and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass.” Doctors next
use various methods to evacuate the skull contents and crush
the skull to allow it to pass. The Court reviews its holdings in
Roe v. Wade27 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey28 and finds that Casey allows “‘[r]egulations … by which
the State, … express[es] profound respect for the life of the
unborn …, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
exercise of the right to choose.’” The respondents assert that
“the Act is void for vagueness” and alternatively that “the Act’s
text proscribes all D&Es,” thereby imposing an undue burden.
The Court finds the Act not void for vagueness because it
clearly requires a doctor to vaginally deliver a fetus to an
anatomical landmark, perform an overt act to kill the partially
delivered fetus, and have the requisite scienter in performing
this act for a violation to occur. The Court also rejects the
respondents’ undue-burden argument because the Act only
prohibits intact D&Es and intent is required. Next, the Court
addresses whether the Act is unconstitutional because its
“‘purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion….’” The Court finds that it is
reasonable for Congress to determine that “the abortion methods it proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a
newborn infant’” and that the Act “furthers the Government’s
objectives.” The Court acknowledges that the Act would be
unconstitutional if it “‘subject[ed] [women] to significant
health risks’” but states that the record shows a “documented
medical disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would
ever impose significant health risks on women” and that this
disagreement is not sufficient to demonstrate sufficient health
risks. The Court concludes by noting that the Act might still
be open to a proper as-applied challenge but that the facial
challenges at issue will not invalidate it.

27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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[A] 7-1 Court held

In Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC v. Billing,29 a 7-1 that securities law
Court held that securities law
precludes the
precludes the application of
application of
antitrust law to alleged antiantitrust law
competitive activities during
to alleged
the marketing of IPOs because
it is “clearly incompatible”
anticompetitive
with antitrust law. The petiactivities during
tioners are underwriters who
the marketing
facilitate an initial public offering (IPO) of shares in a comof IPOs . . . .
pany. In doing so, they engage
in “book building” by interviewing potential investors to determine the price and quantity
of shares to be offered. After this process, the petitioners discuss arrangements for the offering with the offering company
and then buy shares at a discounted price, which the petitioner
resells to investors at the price determined through book
building, “in effect earning its commission in the process.”
The petitioners were sued by the respondents, a group of 60
investors, for actions during this process, which respondents
allege violated various federal and state antitrust laws, including section 1 of the Sherman Act. The petitioners seek to dismiss the complaint “on the ground that federal securities law
impliedly precludes application of antitrust laws to the conduct in question.” The Court first states that the relevant issue
is “whether, given context and likely consequences, there is a
‘clear repugnancy’ between the securities law and the antitrust
complaint—or … whether the two are ‘clearly incompatible.’”
Four factors are critical in this determination: “(1) the existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to supervise the activities in question;” (2) a showing that the regulator “exercise[s] that authority;” (3) a risk of conflict between
the two statutes if both were followed; and (4) the presence of
“practices that lie squarely within an area of financial market
activity that the securities law seeks to regulate.” The Court
finds that the fourth factor is present because “the activities in
question here … [are] central to the proper functioning of
well-regulated capital markets.” The Court also finds that the
first and second factors are met because the SEC has “authority to supervise all of the activities here in question” and “has
continuously exercised its legal authority to regulate” this conduct. The central issue is the third factor: whether there is “a
conflict that rises to the level of incompatibility.” The Court
believes that “there is no practical way to confine antitrust
suits so that they challenge only activity of the kind the
investors seek to target…” and that antitrust courts “are likely
to make unusually serious mistakes in this respect.” Also, the
Court finds that “any enforcement-related need for an antitrust
lawsuit is unusually small” because the SEC enforces its rules,
and investors can challenge activities and receive damages
under relevant securities law. Because the four requisite ele-

29. 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
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ments are present, the Court
concludes that “securities
laws are ‘clearly incompatible’ with the application of
the antitrust laws in this context.”
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.,30 an 8-1
Court held that the “strong
inference” standard in the
Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
requires a plaintiff to allege in his or her complaint “facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.” Congress passed the PSLRA to
“check against abusive litigation by private parties” within the
securities context. The plaintiffs are required to “‘state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.’” The respondents are shareholders who purchased stock in the petitioner
Tellabs, Inc., in 2000 and 2001. They allege that during this
period, the petitioner Richard Notebaert, acting as CEO and
president of Tellabs, “knowingly misled the public” with false
statements and representations regarding the company. By
2001, evidence of the company’s troubles came to light, and
the stock price dropped significantly. The respondents filed a
class-action lawsuit in 2002. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
held that the “strong inference” requirement is met if a complaint “‘alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable person
could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent
….” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the Circuit Courts of Appeals in interpreting this
requirement. The Court first notes that the PSLRA was partially intended to resolve a split among the circuits regarding
the correct standard for pleading requirements of scienter in a
private party’s securities-related action. The Court concludes
that it must “prescribe a workable construction of the ‘strong
inference’ standard, a reading geared to the PSLRA’s twin goals:
to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.” To this
end, the Court states three prescriptions: (1) when deciding a
motion to dismiss, courts must accept the complaint’s alleged
facts as true; (2) courts must examine the complaint and referenced documents in their entirety; and (3) in applying the
“strong inference” standard, courts “must take into account
plausible opposing inferences.” In reaching the third prescription, the Court rejects the Seventh Circuit’s standard because
the PSLRA does not require plaintiffs “to allege facts from
which an inference of scienter rationally could be drawn” but
more specifically “require[s] plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts that give rise to a ‘strong’—i.e., a powerful or cogent—
inference.” The Court holds that “[a] complaint will survive
… only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” In conclusion,

the Court rejects the Seventh Circuit’s standard, but “do[es]
not decide whether … [respondents’] allegations warrant ‘a
strong inference that [Notebaert and Tellabs] acted with the
required state of mind ….’”
In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,31 the Court held
that the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (FCRA) adverse-action
notice requirement only applies when an action is willful or
reckless and only if the proposed premium rate is above a
“neutral” rate that would apply regardless of the consumer’s
credit report. The FCRA requires that “‘any person [who]
takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is
based … on any information contained in a consumer [credit]
report’ must notify the affected customer.” If a breach of the
statute is willful, a consumer can be awarded actual or statutory damages, and possibly punitive damages. The respondent
Ajene Edo applied for auto insurance from the petitioner
GEICO, who obtained his credit score and offered him a “standard policy … (at rates higher than the most favorable), which
he accepted.” Under GEICO’s tiered scheme, Edo was not
offered a “preferred policy,” but the standard policy offered was
no different from the “neutral” rate he would have received
without consideration of his credit report. GEICO did not
send Edo an adverse-action notice. Edo brought suit alleging a
willful failure to give notice and seeking statutory and punitive
damages. The respondents Charles Burr and Shannon Massey
were similarly offered higher rates from the petitioner Safeco,
who based these premiums partially on their credit reports.
After Safeco failed to send adverse-action notices, the respondents joined a class action against Safeco. The Court first
examines the definition of “willful” under FCRA and finds that
under common usage, it includes “reckless disregard.” The
Court next addresses the initial issue of “whether either company violated the adverse action requirement at all.” Under
FCRA, an adverse action can only occur in these circumstances
if “quoting or charging a first-time premium is ‘an increase in
any charge for … any insurance….’” The Court holds that “the
‘increase’ required for ‘adverse action’… speaks to a disadvantageous rate even with no prior dealing.” Additionally, the
Court accepts GEICO’s argument “that in order to have
adverse action ‘based on’ a credit report, consideration of the
report must be a necessary precondition for the increased
rate.” In light of these findings, the Court states that it must
identify “the benchmark for determining whether a first-time
rate is a disadvantageous increase.” GEICO argues that the
baseline should be the neutral rate obtained by not taking an
applicant’s credit score into account at all. The Court agrees
because it feels GEICO’s proposed definition is more in keeping with the “based on” causation requirement discussed
above. The Court holds that because “the initial rate offered to
Edo was the one he would have received if his credit score had
not been taken into account,” GEICO was not required to send
an adverse-action notice. With regard to Safeco, the Court
finds that the insurer understood the adverse-action notice
requirement as not applying to initial applications for insurance. The Court holds that because it is clear from the record

30. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).

31. 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
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that Safeco did not act recklessly or willfully in this misinterpretation of FCRA, it cannot be liable even if its actions otherwise meet the “adverse action” requirement.
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,32 a 5-4
Court held that vertical price restraints should be judged
under the Sherman Act by the rule of reason and not by a per
se rule of illegality. The petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc., is a manufacturer of leather goods and accessories. The respondent, PSKS, Inc., sold the petitioner’s goods
in its retail establishment Kay’s Kloset beginning in 1995. In
1997, the petitioner began a program under which it “refused
to sell to retailers that discounted [its] goods below suggested
prices.” In 2002, the petitioner learned that Kay’s Kloset had
violated the policy and asked the respondent to stop. After it
refused, the petitioner stopped selling to Kay’s Kloset. The
Respondent sued, alleging that the petitioner had violated
antitrust laws. The Court begins by examining section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits “‘[e]very contract … in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states.’” The Court
notes that this has never applied literally, but only to “‘unreasonable restraints’” and that the reasonableness of a particular
contract is usually determined by applying the rule of reason,
under which “‘the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.’” However, some practices are governed by a per se rule
of illegality because they “‘would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output.’” For example, Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.33 has been interpreted as “establishing a per se rule against a vertical agreement
between a manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum
resale prices.” The Court finds that recent cases have rejected
the “‘formalistic’” reasoning of Dr. Miles in favor an evaluation
of “‘demonstrable economic effect’” and concludes that the Dr.
Miles opinion is insufficient to justify a per se rule. In undertaking its own evaluation, the Court finds that in light of the
opposing viewpoints of economists on the subject, “it cannot
be stated with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance ‘always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output.’” For this reason, the Court states
that “were [it] considering the issue as an original matter,” it
would apply the rule of reason to vertical price restraints. The
Court next examines the doctrine of stare decisis, noting that it
is weakened in the context of the Sherman Act because “[f]rom
the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute,” making it more adaptable to “modern
understanding and greater experience.” In addition, the Court
finds that subsequent decisions have weakened Dr. Miles’s
“‘doctrinal underpinnings.’” Therefore, the Court overrules Dr.
Miles and holds that vertical price restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

In KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,34 a unanimous Court held

32. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
33. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

that the respondent’s patent on
[A] 5-4 Court held
an electronic pedal sensor is
void for obviousness because it that vertical price
can be derived by a person of restraints should
ordinary skill from previous be judged under
patents. In 1999, the petitioner
KSR International Company the Sherman Act
patented an “adjustable pedal
by the rule of
system for various lines of autoreason and not
mobiles with cable-actuated
by a per se rule
throttle controls.” When KSR
of illegality.
was hired by General Motors
Corporation to manufacture
pedals, it “added a modular sensor” to its previous design to
ensure compatibility. The respondent Teleflex Incorporated
sued KSR for infringing upon its Engelgau patent. Claim 4 of
the Engelgau patent “describes a mechanism for combining an
electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so the
pedal’s position can be transmitted to a computer that controls
the throttle in the vehicle’s engine.” KSR argued that claim 4’s
content is obvious and that the patent is invalid under the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. section 103, which “forbids issuance of a
patent” if “the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains.” The District Court found “‘little
difference’” between the prior art and the Engelgau patent and
concluded that claim 4 was obvious. However, the “District
Court was not permitted to stop there” because the Federal
Circuit applies a “‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ test
(TSM test).” Under the TSM test, a patent claim can be obvious only if “‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the
prior art teachings’ can be found in the prior art, the nature of
the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary
skill in the art.” The District Court concluded that KSR satisfied this test and granted its motion for summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
“the District Court had not been strict enough in applying” the
TSM test. The Court “begin[s] by rejecting the rigid approach
of the Court of Appeals” because its previous “cases have set
forth an expansive and flexible approach.” The Court next
examines the TSM test, agreeing that “it can be important to
identify a reason that would have prompted a person … to
combine the elements,” but finding that “obviousness analysis
cannot be confined” to such a formalistic test. The Court finds
the Federal Circuit erred “by holding that courts and patent
examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was
trying to solve” because the correct inquiry is whether it was
obvious to a person of ordinary skill, not the individual patentee. The Court agrees with the District Court’s finding that
there is little difference between the combination of previous
patents and the Engelgau patent, and “a person having ordinary skill in the art could have combined [a previous patent]

34. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
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with a pedal position sensor in a
fashion encompassed by claim
4, and would have seen the benefits of doing so.” Therefore,
the Court concludes claim 4 is
obvious.
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp.,35 a 7-1 Court held that
Microsoft is not liable for overseas
patent
infringement
because sending a master version of software overseas is not
supplying a component from
the United States under section 271(f) of the Patent Act of
1984. Generally, a patent infringement does not occur “when
a patented product is made and sold in another country.”
However, section 271(f) of the Patent Act of 1984 contains an
exception to this rule “when one ‘supplies … from the United
States,’ for ‘combination’ abroad, a patented invention’s ‘components.’” The respondent AT&T holds a patent on a device
used “for digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech”
and the petitioner Microsoft’s Windows software “has the
potential to infringe AT&T’s patent, because Windows incorporates software code that, when installed, enable a computer
to process speech” in this manner. Microsoft sells master versions of Windows to overseas manufacturers of computers
who copy this master version and install these copies onto
their products. In 2001, AT&T sued Microsoft in federal court
for infringing its patent as a result of these foreign installations
of Windows. Microsoft argues that the master versions sold
were not “‘supplie[d] … from the United States” and were not
“‘component[s]’” covered under section 271(f). The Court
begins by stating the two issues to be addressed: (1) “[W]hen
… does software qualify as a ‘component’ under §271(f)”; and
(2) “[W]ere ‘components’ of the foreign-made computers
involved in this case ‘supplie[d]’ by Microsoft ‘from the United
States’?” Turning to the first question, the Court finds that
Windows software in the abstract cannot be combined to
infringe on AT&T’s patent but must be installed from “a computer-readable ‘copy’” in order to do so. Therefore, the Court
concludes that uninstalled Windows software is not a component within the meaning of section 271(f). Next, the Court
examines the question of whether components were supplied
from the United States. The Court notes that “the copies of
Windows actually installed on the foreign computers were not
themselves supplied from the Unites States” but were “generated by third parties outside the United States.” Because section 271(f) is silent on the issue of copying, the Court concludes that this “weighs against a judicial determination that
replication abroad of a master dispatched from the United
States ‘supplies’ the foreign-made copies from the United
States.”

[A] 5-4 Court held
that the Clean Air
Act requires the
EPA to issue
regulations
governing new
vehicle emissions
of greenhouse
gases.

35. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
36. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

In Massachusetts v. E.P.A.,36 a 5-4 Court held that the Clean
Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to issue regulations governing new-vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases. Under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the
EPA is required to “prescribe … standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles, which … cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare ….” In 1999, several private organizations petitioned the EPA to regulate “‘greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles under §202,’” arguing that these gases
have “accelerated climate change.” In 2003, the EPA denied
the organizations’ petition, stating that “the Clean Air Act does
not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address
global climate change” and that even if it did, “it would be
unwise to do so at this time.” The organizations were joined
by several states and local governments and sought review of
EPA’s denial. The Court begins by addressing the issue of
standing because at least one petitioner must demonstrate the
requirements of injury, causation, and remedy. Using
Massachusetts as an example, the Court finds the first requirement met because the injuries “associated with climate change
are serious and well recognized.” With regard to the second,
the Court finds that a reduction in auto emissions could be a
significant step in battling global warming. Turning to the
remedy requirement, the Court finds that the EPA’s actions
could “slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter
what happens elsewhere.” Because all three requirements are
met, Massachusetts has standing to challenge the EPA’s decision. Turning to the merits of the case, the Court finds that
greenhouse gases are air pollutants within the Act’s broad
definition and that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions from new vehicles. Finally, the Court
addresses the EPA’s alternative argument that even if it has this
authority, “it would be unwise to do so at this time.” While
recognizing that the EPA has some discretion under the
statute, the Court states that it “can avoid taking further action
only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute
to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation
as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion.” Because
the EPA has not met these requirements, the Court holds that
its denial was “‘arbitrary, capricious, … or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’”
In U. S. v. Atlantic Research Corp.,37 a unanimous Court held
that section 107(a)(4)(B) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) provides the respondent with a cause of
action against the petitioner for reimbursement of environmental cleanup costs. CERCLA contains two provisions that
“allow private parties to recover expenses associated with
cleaning up contaminated sites.” Section 107(a) makes four
categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) liable for
“(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the

37. 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).

United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan; [and] (B) any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan.” Section 113(f)
additionally “authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribution in certain circumstances.” In Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Aviall Services, Inc.,38 the Court held that “a private party could
seek contribution from other liable parties only after having
been sued under §106 or §107(a).” Cooper, however, left open
the issue of “whether PRPs have rights under §107(a)(4)(B).”
In the instant case, the respondent Atlantic Research was hired
by the petitioner United States to retrofit rocket motors.
During this process, the respondent contaminated nearby “soil
and groundwater,” cleaned the site, and later sought contribution from the petitioner under sections 107(a) and 113(f).
After the Court’s decision in Cooper, however, the respondent
“amended its complaint to seek relief under §107(a) and federal common law.” The Court begins by noting that “[t]he parties’ dispute centers on what ‘other person[s]’ may sue under
§107(a)(4)(B).” The Court agrees with Atlantic Research that
“subparagraph (B) can be understood only with reference to
subparagraph (A)” and “any other person” includes “anyone
except the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe—the persons listed in subparagraph (A).” The government argues that
the Court’s “interpretation will create friction between §107(a)
and §113(f).” The Court rejects this reasoning, noting that it
has “previously recognized that §§107(a) and 113(f) provide
two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies” in that section 113(f) allows a
right to contribution “contingent upon an inequitable distribution of common liability among liable parties” while section
107(a) “permits recovery of cleanup costs but does not create
a right to contribution.” The Court concludes that the government’s fears of “friction” are unfounded and that section
107(a)(4)(B) “provides Atlantic Research with a cause of
action.”
In National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,39
a 5-4 Court held that a mandatory provision of the Clean
Water Act of 1972 (CWA) controls a mandatory provision of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). The CWA provides
that the EPA shall administer the review and approval of permits under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) in each state. A state can apply to take control of its permitting system, and if it makes a showing of nine
criteria, the EPA “‘shall approve’” its application. The ESA is
designed to protect endangered species and gives the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) authority to administer the ESA with respect
to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Commerce, respectively. Under section 7
of the ESA, federal agencies must “‘insure that any action
authorized … by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species ….’” In 2002,
Arizona applied to administer its NPDES permitting system,
and the EPA began to consult with FWS regarding the applica-
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requirements. After further
consultation,
the
EPA
approved the transfer to
Arizona. The respondents filed a petition “seeking review of
the transfer,” and the petitioners, the National Association of
Home Builders, were granted permission to intervene. The
respondent Defenders of Wildlife filed a different action, alleging that the FWS failed to comply with the ESA in issuing its
biological opinion. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the two
actions, held that the EPA’s decision granting the transfer was
“arbitrary and capricious” and vacated the transfer. The Court
first notes the strong deference it gives agency decisions. The
Court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the
EPA’s position was “‘internally inconsistent’” because the only
inconsistency the respondent’s can point to is that EPA
“changed [its] mind” over the course of consulting with FWS,
and the EPA was “fully entitled to do” so. The Court next
examines the statutory conflict between the CWA and the ESA.
The Court believes that a literal application of the ESA would
“‘ad[d] one [additional] requirement’” to the nine already mandated by the CWA, reversing its mandatory nature. The Court
states that later enacted statutes, like the ESA, are normally not
construed to repeal an earlier provision unless such a construction “‘is absolutely necessary … in order that [the] words
[of the later statute] shall have any meaning at all.’”” Applying
this principle, the Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the ESA that would alter the CWA’s mandate. To
resolve the statutory conflict, the Court looks to the interpretation of the implementing agencies (FSW and NMFS), whose
reading would limit application of section 7 of the ESA to
agency “‘actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control.’” The Court finds that deference to
the agencies’ interpretation is warranted because it is a reasonable reading of the statute. Therefore, the Court concludes
that because EPA’s decision under the CWA is not discretionary, section 7 of the ESA does not control.

38. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
39. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
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IMMIGRATION

In Lopez v. Gonzales,40 an 8-1 Court held that an offense
qualifying as a felony under state law but only as a misdemeanor under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is not a
felony punishable under the CSA. The petitioner Jose Antonio
Lopez entered the United States illegally in 1986 but became a
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legal permanent resident in 1990. In 1997, he pleaded guilty
to aiding and abetting another’s possession of cocaine, a state
felony in South Dakota. After serving 15 months of his fiveyear sentence, the petitioner was released and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) began removal proceedings
against him because his conviction was a controlled substance
violation and an aggravated felony. The petitioner contested
the aggravated-felony classification because his conduct is only
a misdemeanor under the CSA. The immigration judge disagreed because drug possession was a felony under state law.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. This outcome required the mandatory removal of the petitioner, whereas a finding in the petitioner’s favor would leave his removal open for discretionary
cancellation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
conflicting decisions in the circuits regarding the correct interpretation of the CSA in this regard. The Court begins by
addressing the statutory language involved. Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) section 1101(a)(43)(B) defines an
aggravated felony to include “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance … including a drug trafficking crime ….” Title 18
defines drug-trafficking crime as “any felony punishable under
the Controlled Substances Act.” The government argues that
the petitioner’s conduct satisfies this language because it is a
felony, under South Dakota state law, and it is punishable
under the CSA, albeit as a misdemeanor. The Court rejects this
argument because the plain meaning of “trafficking” would not
include the petitioner’s crime of possession. The government’s
interpretation is also rejected because it would “render the law
of alien removal … dependent on varying state criminal classifications” where Congress’s intent seems to be quite the opposite. The Court states that Congress instead likely intended
the law to depend upon the felony and misdemeanor scheme
it establishes in the CSA. In conclusion, the Court holds “that
a state offense constitutes a ‘felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act’ only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.”
In Gonzales v. Duenes-Alvarez,41 an 8-1 Court held that aiding and abetting theft falls within the definition of a generic
theft for the purposes of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). The respondent Luis Duenas-Alvarez
is a permanent resident of the United States. He was convicted as an accessory for violating Cal. Veh. Code Ann. section 10851(a), which states in the pertinent part: “Any person
who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the
consent of the owner thereof … or any person who is a party
or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense.” The
government began removal proceedings against the respondent under the INA, which allows for removal of certain aliens
who are convicted of some offenses, including theft. A federal
immigration judge found that the respondent was removable
because of his conviction. The Bureau of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and the respondent petitioned for

review in the Ninth Circuit.
[A]n 8-1 Court held
The Ninth Circuit remanded
that an indictment
the respondent’s case to the
BIA because of its decision
that fails to allege
in Penuliar v. Ashcroft,42 any overt act in an
which held that Cal. Veh.
attempt offense is
Code Ann. section 10851(a)
“sweeps more broadly than
constitutionally
generic theft.” The Court
sufficient . . . .
begins its analysis by noting
the four traditional common-law aiding-and-abetting categories: (1) first-degree principals; (2) second-degree principals; (3) accessories before the
fact; and (4) accessories after the fact. The Court states that
the first three categories have largely merged, and the vast
majority of jurisdictions now distinguish only between principal accessories and accessories after the fact. The Court
holds that a generic theft offense covers principal accessories
as well as principals. The Court next addresses the respondent’s attempt to demonstrate that the California statute criminalizes conduct that most jurisdictions do not consider
“theft.” The respondent argues that the statute unconstitutionally makes the accused liable for unintended and unforeseen consequences. The Court disagrees and states that such
a showing requires “a realistic probability, not a theoretical
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct
that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” The Court
concludes that the respondent has not met this burden
because he has pointed to no cases involving such a misapplication of the California statute.
In U.S. v. Resendiz-Ponce,43 an 8-1 Court held that an indictment that fails to allege any overt act in an attempt offense is
constitutionally sufficient because it uses the word “attempt”
and describes the time and place of the alleged attempt. The
respondent Juan Resendiz-Ponce was deported in 1988 and
again in 2002. He attempted to reenter the country in 2003 by
presenting the photo identification of his cousin and claiming
to be a legal resident of the United States. The respondent was
charged with violating 8 U.S.C. section 1326(a) for attempting
to reenter the country illegally. The indictment stated that the
respondent “knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter
the United States of America at or near San Luis in the District
of Arizona, after having been previously denied admission,
excluded, deported, and removed from the United States.” The
respondent attempted to have the indictment dismissed on the
grounds that it “fail[ed] to allege an essential element, an overt
act, or to state the essential facts of such over act.” After the
District Court denied the respondent’s motion, he was found
guilty and sentenced to 63 months of imprisonment. The
Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction, finding that the “omission of ‘an essential element of the offense is a fatal flaw and
not subject to mere harmless error analysis.’” The Court
begins by addressing the government’s argument that the
indictment implicitly alleges that the respondent committed

41. 127 S. Ct. 815 (2007).
42. 395 F.3d 1037 (2005).

43. 127 S. Ct. 782 (2007).
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the requisite overt act “simply by alleging that ‘he
attempted to enter the
United States.’” The Court
states that Hamling v. U.S.44
requires two elements for an
indictment to be constitutional: “First, [that it] contains the elements of the
offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the
charge against which he
must defend, and second,
[that it] enables him to plead
an acquittal or conviction in
bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” The Court
holds that the indictment at issue satisfies both of these
requirements by using the word “attempt” and specifying the
time and place of the alleged attempt. The Court also notes
that the indictment complies with the Rule 7(c)(1) requirement that an indictment “be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.”

[A] unanimous
Court held that
overtime and
minimum wage
standards . . .
do not apply to . . .
a domestic caregiver employed by
a third-party
agency . . . .

LABOR LAW

In Beck v. PACE Intern. Union,45 a unanimous Court held
that the petitioner did not breach a fiduciary duty in failing to
fully consider the respondent’s merger proposal. The petitioner Crown Paper provided a defined-benefit pension plan
for the 2,600 persons employed at its paper mills. Under a
defined-benefit pension plan, employers take the risk of covering the pension payments if investments do not pay off but also
benefit if investments provide more than is necessary to cover
the payments. In 2000, the petitioner filed for bankruptcy and
considered termination of its pension plan under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
through the purchase of annuities. The respondent PACE
International Union represented the petitioner’s employees
covered under the defined-benefit plans. Instead of terminating the pension plan, the respondent proposed a merger with
the PACE Industrial Union Management Pension Fund
(PIUMPF) that would shift all plan assets and liability to
PIUMPF. While examining its pension plan, however, Crown
“discovered that it had overfunded certain of its pension plans,
so that purchasing annuities would allow it to retain a projected $5 million reversion.” This reversion would go to
PIUMPF under PACE’s proposed merger. Crown rejected the
respondent’s merger proposal and decided to terminate its plan
through the purchase of annuities, allowing Crown “to reap
the $5 million reversion in surplus funds.” In response, PACE
filed suit against Crown in Bankruptcy Court, “alleging that
Crown’s directors had breached their fiduciary duties under
ERISA by neglecting to give diligent consideration to PACE’s
merger proposal.” The Bankruptcy Court agreed and issued a

44. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
45. 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007).
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preliminary injunction against Crown, “preventing [it] from
obtaining the $5 million reversion.” The petitioner appealed
to the District Court, which affirmed, as did the Ninth Circuit.
The Court begins its discussion by noting that under ERISA,
an employer only has a fiduciary duty when acting as plan
administrator as the decision “whether to terminate an ERISA
plan is … immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.” PACE
acknowledges this but “says that its proposed merger was different, because [it] represented a method of terminating the
Crown plans.” Because ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty in
selecting annuities when terminating a plan, PACE argues this
duty should similarly apply to the merger method of termination. In examining this argument, the Court finds that it must
first determine whether the proposed merger is “a permissible
form of plan termination under ERISA.” The Court states that
section 1341(b)(3)(A) of ERISA contains an exhaustive list of
procedures for terminating pension plans and agrees with petitioner that the merger plan is not included. The Court further
notes that merger is not explicitly mentioned in the section but
is “expressly provided for in an entirely separate set of statutory sections.” In light of this interpretation, the Court concludes that the merger is not permissible, and Crown did not
breach a fiduciary duty in not considering PACE’s merger proposal.
In Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,46 a unanimous
Court held that overtime and minimum-wage standards in the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) do not apply to the
respondent because she is a domestic caregiver employed by a
third-party agency, and Department of Labor (DOL) regulations exempt her from these requirements. The FLSA was
amended by Congress in 1974 “to include many ‘domestic service’ employees ….” However, Congress exempted “any
employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who … are unable
to care for themselves.” Shortly thereafter, the DOL issued a
regulation limiting the term “domestic service employment” to
employees who work “‘in or about a private home … of the person by whom he or she is employed.” Another DOL regulation,
the “third-party regulation,” defines exempt companionship
workers as those “‘who are employed by an employer or
agency other than the family or household using their services….” The respondent Evelyn Coke is a domestic worker
“who provides ‘companionship services’ to elderly and infirm
men and women.” She brought suit against her former
employer, the petitioner Long Island Care at Home, alleging a
failure to compensate her for overtime and minimum wages
that she was entitled to under the FLSA. The District Court
dismissed her claim, citing the DOL third-party regulation.
The Second Circuit reversed because it found the third-party
regulation “‘unenforceable.’” The Court begins by noting that
administrative agencies have the power to “‘formulat[e] …
policy … to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.” The Court will generally defer to those regulations
if they are reasonable “and in accordance with other applicable

46. 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).

(e.g., procedural) requirements.” The Court finds that the
FLSA contains explicit gaps regarding the definitions of
“domestic service employment” and “companionship service,”
and that the DOL has “the power to fill these gaps.” The
respondent argues that the third-party regulation is unreasonable because: (1) it “falls outside the scope of Congress’ delegation;” (2) it contradicts another binding regulation; (3) it
does not “[warrant] judicial deference;” and (4) it “was
improperly promulgated.” The Court rejects the first argument because the FLSA “language refers broadly to ‘domestic
service employment’ and ‘companionship services.’” The
Court states that this leaves it to the DOL to “work out the
details of those broad definitions.” The respondent’s second
argument is that the third-party regulation conflicts with the
DOL regulation defining “domestic service employment.” The
Court acknowledges a conflict but concludes that the thirdparty regulation controls because it believes congressional
intent is more in line with this conclusion. Also, the Court
states that “normally the specific governs the general” and
finds that the third-party regulation is more specific in its purpose. The Court rejects the respondent’s third argument
because it finds that the DOL clearly intended the regulation to
be legally binding in that it “used full public notice-and-comment procedures” when passing the regulation and has since

“treated [it] … as a legally binding exercise of its rulemaking
authority.” In this situation, the Court concludes that “a court
ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to the
agency’s determination.” Finally, the respondent argues that
the “notice-and-comment procedure, leading to the promulgation of the third-party regulation, was legally ‘defective’
because notice was inadequate and the [DOL’s] explanation
also inadequate.” The Court disagrees, finding that the final
third-party regulation was a foreseeable outgrowth of the proposal during the notice-and-comment procedure and that
there is no “significant legal problem with the [DOL’s] explanation for the change.” For the foregoing reasons, the Court
concludes that the third-party regulation controls.
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